CESRAN is a registered CIC (Community Interest Company) in the UK | No: 08189980

facebook 22

twitter 22

linkedin 22

googleplus 22

rss 22

Middle Eastern Studies Articles and Reports

Constraints on Aid Conditionality: The case of the European Commission and the Palestinian Authority

The international community has come in for a great deal of criticism in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and especially within the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.  The donors who dominate the international community are accused of shaping and dictating the development of Palestinian political, economic and social life. 

BY DR GUY BURTON  | October 07, 2012

European-Commission1

This claim is based on their ability to impose their agenda on a relatively weak and dependent Palestinian community through the use of their financial assistance.

The underlying assumption associated with this perspective is that power lies with the donor rather than the Palestinian recipients.  Indeed, the Palestinian case is both pertinent and unique.  It is especially pertinent because it is one where the general assumption is that donors are largely in control of the aid relationship while Palestinians are denied agency as a result.  It is also unique because Palestinians are one of the largest recipients of donor aid per capita in the world.  As a result, the implications of donor conditionality and their impact are therefore magnified in the Palestinian context, providing a useful insight for other cases of aid and aid conditionality.  Moreover, it arguably leads to a relatively weak position for Palestinians, since their reliance on donor assistance should rob them of their agency.

Given these issues then, the criticism of the international community and the lack of Palestinian agency are evident in both direct and indirect ways.  First, in terms of direct actions, foreign donors stand accused of dictating the terms on which aid is provided in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) of the West Bank and Gaza. Both the US and European Union (EU) have come in for particular attention in this regard, through the requirements that they make of Palestinian beneficiaries not to make use of their financial resources in ways which may assist ‘terror’ organisations like the Islamist political party, Hamas.  Second, donors are accused of setting the wider agenda for development through their selective support of the Palestinian leadership prepared to implement their preferred policies, in particular those related to structural readjustment, liberalisation programmes in the economic and social spheres and the expansion of security services and their reform. The result is that in both cases donors are seen to ‘condition’ their assistance.

But to what extent is this state of affairs accurate?  Is it really the case that donors dominate Palestinian political life?  This article challenges this assumption by studying the relationship between donor and recipient in the Palestinian context through the specific case of the European Commission (EC) and the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Particular attention is given to the 2006-07 period when the EC failed to realise its objectives.  Indeed, contrary to the assumptions made about donors in the OPT, the EC has not been as successful at imposing its objectives as is sometimes believed.  While it has certainly sought to impose its agenda on the political, economic and social dimensions of Palestinian life, it has not completely succeeded in this regard.  By analysing the role of aid conditionality, the article accounts for the ways in which the EC appears to have achieved its goals while also illustrating the ways in which it has not.  Specifically, the article notes the importance of structure has been largely overlooked in accounts of why conditionality may fail.  The case of the EC and the PA therefore provides a useful account of how this can happen, where despite pursuing its own agenda, the EC found itself undermined in a number of indirect ways.


*Published in JOURNAL OF GLOBAL ANALYSIS (JGA) | VOL. 3 | NO. 2
© Copyright 2012 by CESRAN

or

AddThis
 

Syria’s Propaganda War

Both sides in the Syrian conflict — and all the Middle Eastern powers — are manipulating events and rumours for their own purposes. Media access to hard facts is limited where it exists at all, and anyway most media want a simple, sympathetic narrative, and want it now
BY ANTONIN AMADO and MARC DE MIRAMON
Bessar Esad Halep

Le Figaro reported last month that Syria’s chemical weapons were “under surveillance” and that “US special forces have been deployed to prevent their use.” A diplomat in Jordan warned that “it’s the threat of chemical weapons that may trigger a targeted American intervention.” Give or take a few details, it’s the same script as in Baghdad 10 years ago: is Bashar al-Assad about to unleash weapons of mass destruction on his opponents? The claim has been around for some time: Bernard-Henri Lévy’s website (1) reported last September that “Assad’s killers have launched aerial operations using poison gas in the Al-Rastan area, not far from the rebel city of Homs.”

AFP (Agence France Presse) cautiously reported on 27 July that it “has heard this claim from dozens of people in the province of Hama. But in spite of weeks of research, no rebel or tribal leader, doctor, combatant or civilian has been able to produce irrefutable proof.” It concluded: “The war in Syria is also a war of information and disinformation.”

The war of words began on 29 January on a Twitter account (@DamascusTweets) belonging to “militants with close links to the opposition” (2), which claimed that Assad had fled the country. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) allegedly had the president’s palace surrounded and the cornered dictator had tried to get to the international airport and fly to Moscow with his wife and children. Though unverifiable, the rumour was “not without foundation”, claimed the Nouvel Observateur’s website: “According to Jeremy Bowen, the BBC’s Middle East correspondent, the FSA is just 30 minutes away from Assad’s presidential palace. It’s a military situation that could push the dictator to flee” (3).

On 18 July, during a new rebel offensive which brought fiercer fighting than Damascus had yet seen, a bomb went off at the headquarters of the Syrian National Security Council, killing the defence minister and Assad’s brother-in-law Assef Shawkat. On French news channels, opposition figures, most of them from the Syrian National Council (SNC), commented on events as they unfolded: the regime’s days were numbered; it might even collapse in a matter of hours. “We can say that it’s the beginning of the end,” said Randa Kassis (4), president of the Coalition of Secular and Democratic Syrians, which is part of the SNC. Anonymous sources quoted in The Guardian alleged that Assad himself had been injured in the attack. His wife was again reported to have flown to Moscow. The FSA and a small Islamist group both claimed responsibility for the attack, while the regime detected the hand of “foreign powers” (Turkey, Qatar or Saudi Arabia) supporting the opposition army.

Then AFP reported (shortly before 9am on 20 July) that Assad, unharmed after all, had agreed to leave two days later, “but in a civilised fashion”. Confirmed half an hour later by Reuters, the news had picked up on an interview given by Russia’s ambassador in Paris to Radio France Internationale (RFI). But he hadn’t announced Assad’s departure at all, merely issued a reminder that Syria had undertaken to move towards a “more democratic regime” in Geneva on 30 June.

  • Media war unreported

Syrians have been fighting for democracy since March 2011 in a popular uprising that has been brutally repressed and widely documented (5). But a media war is also being waged, and that has largely gone unreported by western news organisations. It’s true that it’s very hard to tell truth from fiction on the ground. The regime is sparing with the visas it grants. Nearly all the journalists who succeed in joining the rebels (at the risk of their lives) follow the FSA line. Their reports follow the narrative developed by the FSA and its Turkish, Saudi and Qatari affiliates: a barbaric regime is bloodily crushing peaceful demonstrations that are defended by pro-democracy militants who have plenty of courage but little by way of weapons, ammunition or medical supplies.

Unsurprisingly, the few journalists who have accepted the invitation of the Assad regime tell a radically different story: of hideously mutilated soldiers’ bodies piled in hospital morgues, of members of Alawite and Christian minorities terrorised by armed gangs engaged not in a war of liberation but a religious war, with the backing of the Gulf’s oil-producing monarchies.

To the embarrassment of the opposition army, the presence in Syria of jihadist groups, some claiming links to Al-Qaida, is an established fact. Another reason, Libération insisted on 6 August, to help the insurgents “politically and militarily, even if only to avoid leaving the field and the final victory to the Islamists.”

Separating the revolutionary wheat from jihadist chaff often turns out to be difficult. Abu Hajjar, “one of the mujahideen, who left the Paris area four months ago to take part in the uprising against the Assad regime”, defines himself as an “Islamist militant, not a jihadist linked to Al-Qaida”. Profiled in Le Figaro, he insisted that the Alawite and Christian minorities, most of whom support the Assad regime, would be represented in a future Syrian parliament (6). He also said he had opened a “centre for preaching” in the village of Sarjeh to distribute “banned books” by Ibn Taymiyya, a “great theoretician of jihad”, Le Figaro added, failing to mention that he had also issued a fatwa calling for a holy war against the Alawites.

But such testimony doesn’t alter the larger narrative of the Syrian drama, which is dominated by a handful of protagonists and events: the siege of Homs, the massacre at Houla, the death of the journalists Marie Colvin, Rémi Ochlik, and Gilles Jacquier (who it now seems was probably killed by fire from rebel positions). The reporting of the conflict is dominated by a few players including the main Middle Eastern satellite news channels, especially Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera, owned by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two heavyweights in the Arab League, the new mouthpiece for Gulf diplomacy. These absolute monarchies, which promote “freedom” among their neighbours without having any democratic legitimacy of their own, are conducting a regional cold war in Syria, the last Arab regime that, in their view, is a participant in the “Shia arc”, which extends from Beirut to Baghdad, bringing instability to Bahrain.

  • Unreliable information

These news channels benefit from the public’s predisposition to believe the information they broadcast, however unreliable. Columnist Caroline Fourest wrote in Le Monde on 25 February: “According to Al-Arabiya, opponents of the Iranian regime say their government has given a crematorium oven to its Syrian ally. Installed in Aleppo’s industrial zone, it will be working at full capacity... perhaps to burn the bodies of its opponents.”

Otherwise, the media rely on the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), which through AFP, AP and Reuters, disseminates death tolls from military engagements and reports from the armed opposition. Its founder, Rami Abdel Rahman, went to live in the UK in 2000, where he runs a clothing shop. From his flat in Coventry, he said: “I am the only member of my organisation based in the UK. But I have 200 volunteer correspondents in Syria, Egypt, Turkey and Lebanon. They are soldiers, doctors and opposition militants.” He claims complete neutrality: “I’m not financed by anyone. I set up the SOHR in 2006 because I wanted to do something for my country.” But with only a secretary to assist him, there must be a question mark over his ability to obtain and verify the numbers of dead and injured in military confrontations all over Syria almost as they happen.

Nonetheless, AFP has accorded the SOHR the status of a key source. Ezzedine Said explained: “We first used the SOHR back in November 2006. The organisation has shown itself to be trustworthy and credible in the past, which is why we continue to use it.” The agency’s chief editor in Nicosia, from where its reports on the Middle East are coordinated, acknowledged that “our journalists have almost no contact with the organisation’s correspondents on the ground. Those working in Damascus cannot operate freely. They are not in a position to give an overview of the situation around the country. The SOHR, though it never takes a political position in its communiqués, is not a perfect source. But it is the source that gives the least unreliable figures on the number of dead on the ground.” Some people at APF are uncomfortable with this: “We know very well that the SOHR is not reliable,” one leading reporter said. “Even so, we continue to use their figures. When you ask management, the answer is always the same: ‘You’re probably right, but the other agencies use them and we’re in a highly competitive business’.”

The way in which the SOHR covered the Houla massacre, for example, raises questions about its claimed impartiality and the reliability of its sources. This much is clear: on 25 May, 108 people were massacred in Houla. The bodies of 49 children and 34 women were found in this area to the north of Homs. In a communiqué dated 26 May and relayed by AFP, the SOHR initially reported that 90 people had been killed in bombardments. UN and Arab League accredited observers claimed three days later that most of the victims had been killed with bladed weapons. The UN revealed the same day that the area where the massacre took place was held by the rebels.

A UN Human Rights Council report published on 16 August said that most of the victims had been killed by government forces, even though its investigators had not visited Houla and so were unable to verify the identity of those responsible. But this didn’t prevent the SOHR’s initial report being widely disseminated and used in French diplomatic efforts to make Russia yield to the UN Security Council: “The Houla massacre may change minds,” the French foreign minister Laurent Fabius told Le Monde on 29 May.

Donatella Rovera of Amnesty International secretly entered Syria in April and spent three weeks trying to assess the human cost of the conflict. She underlined the difficulty of the task: “Hospitals aren’t a reliable source, because the injured can’t go there without being arrested by the security forces. I was in Aleppo during a huge army operation. I saw small ad hoc medical units set up in apartments where under-equipped doctors were trying to tend the injured. Under such conditions, the tallies are simpler to take. When you arrive after the event, you have to take statements from survivors and neighbours and collect evidence on the ground such as shell casings and bullet holes in walls.” She said it is “possible to work from outside the country, but that adds to the difficulties. Especially over the reliability of sources you don’t know, who may be tempted to try to manipulate us.” At the end of July, Amnesty reported that 12,000 people had been killed, compared to the SOHR’s 19,000. The rigorous methods that Amnesty claims contrast with the figures provided by Abdel Rahman. But that rigour is incompatible with the demand for instant reporting that now rules the media world, especially online.


First Published at Le Monde diplomatique.

Marc de Miramon and Antonin Amado are journalists.

(1) “Syrie: la révolution s’arme et a besoin de l’OTAN” (Syria: the revolution is arming itself and needs Nato), 30 September 2011; www.laregledujeu.org

(2) “Bachar Al-Assad s’est enfui... sur Twitter” (Bashar al-Assad has fled... on Twitter), 30 January 2012.

(3) “Bachar Al-Assad a-t-il tenté de fuir la Syrie vers Moscou?” (Has Bashar al-Assad attempted to flee Syria for Moscow?), 30 January 2012.

(4) “Bataille de Damas: les jours d’Assad sont-ils comptés?” (The battle for Damascus: are Assad’s days numbered?), Le Débat, France 24, 19 July 2012.

(5) “Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Enforced Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011”, Human Rights Watch, New York, July 2012.

(6) Le Figaro, Paris, 4-5 August 2012.


AddThis
 

Syria Divides the Arab Left

The violence deepens and spreads. Yet unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the Syrian revolt has not had unanimous support from the Arab left. There is a split between those who sympathise with the protestors’ demands and those who fear foreign interference, both political and military.


BY NICOLAS DOT-POUILLARD | AUGUST 01, 2012

Syria Flag2

Last August the Lebanese leftwing nationalist daily, Al-Akhbar, went through its first crisis since its launch in the summer of 2006 (1). Managing editor Khaled Saghieh left the paper he had helped set up, because of its coverage of the Syrian crisis. Saghieh denounced the paper’s lack of support for the popular uprising that began in March 2011. Al-Akhbar has never denied its political sympathies with Hizbullah, one of Bashar al-Assad’s chief allies in the region, or hidden the fact that it prefers dialogue between the Damascus government and a section of the opposition to the fall of Assad’s regime. The paper has given a voice to certain members of the Syrian opposition, including Salameh Kaileh, a Syrian-Palestinian Marxist intellectual who was arrested this April by the security services.

In June an article by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb (2) provoked dissension within the paper’s English online version. The Lebanese commentator placed herself firmly behind the Damascus regime, and criticised supporters of a “third way” — those who denounce the regime while warning against western military intervention on the Libyan model. The same month another Al-Akhbar English journalist, Max Blumenthal, announced he was leaving in an article criticising “Assad apologists” within the editorial staff (3).

Al-Akhbar’s crisis is symptomatic of the debate dividing the Arab left, ideologically and strategically. Some continue to support the Syrian regime in the name of the struggle against Israel and resistance to imperialism. Others stand staunchly with the opposition, in the name of revolution and the defence of democratic rights. Still others support a middle way between showing solidarity (from a distance) with the protestors’ demands for freedom, and rejecting foreign interference: they advocate some kind of national reconciliation. The Syrian crisis is making the Arab left — whether strictly Communist, tending towards Marxist, leftwing nationalist, radical or moderate — seem in disarray.

There is little unequivocal support for the Assad clan, and few people are calling for the regime to carry on as it is; but unconditional supporters of the revolution do not seem to be in the majority either. Most of them are on the far left of the political spectrum, usually Trotskyist (the Socialist Forum in Lebanon, the Revolutionary Socialists in Egypt) or Maoist (the Democratic Way in Morocco). They have links with sections of the opposition, such as Ghayath Naisse’s Syrian Revolutionary Left. Since spring 2011 they have taken part in occasional demonstrations in front of Syrian embassies and consulates in their own countries. There are also some independent leftwing intellectuals who support insurrection, like the Lebanese historian Fawwaz Traboulsi (4). They demand the fall of the regime, and rule out dialogue. Even though they champion peaceful popular protest, they believe the rebels have the right to resort to force of arms. Far left supporters of revolution distance themselves from the Syrian National Council (SNC) (5), one of the main opposition coalitions, because they believe its links with countries such as Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia could compromise the independence of the popular movement.

  • A Prudent Distance

Part of the radical left, though denouncing the Assad regime and calling for its fall, is wary of the support the Gulf monarchies are giving to the Syrian revolutionaries; equally, it dares not subscribe fully to the anti-Assad discourse of the “international community”, especially the US. But this anti-imperialist reflex does not take precedence over support for revolution: what counts is the internal situation in Syria, and the principle of popular uprising, as it did in Tunisia and Egypt.

But the majority of the Arab left are maintaining a prudent distance from the Syrian uprising. They condemn its militarisation, which they say only benefits radical Islamist groups and the foreign fighters flocking to Syria. They criticise the sectarianism of the conflict, pitting first Alawite then Christian minorities against a Sunni majority radicalised by repression, which they fear will lead to unending civil war. And they worry about the regional and international balance of power. With Iran and Syria set against the Gulf monarchies, and Russia and China against the US, Syria has been put on the front line of a great international war game. The left tends to favour Iran and Syria, and Russia and China, rather than those they oppose.

A coalition of six leftist and nationalist parties, including Communists and Arab nationalists, met in Amman on 4 April to mark the ninth anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq. But it was the crisis in Syria, not the fall of Saddam Hussein that dominated discussions. Speakers strongly denounced “foreign intervention” in Syria, and some drew a parallel between the 2003 operation against Iraq and the support of the main western powers for the SNC and the armed opposition in Syria.

The powerful Tunisian General Workers Union (UGTT, some of whose executive members are from the far left) issued a communiqué on 17 May reiterating its support for the democratic demands of the Syrian people, but warning against a “plot” by “colonial and reactionary Arab” states. Two months earlier the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (POCT) and Arab nationalist groups had called a demonstration to protest against the “Friends of Syria” (an organisation that brings together almost 60 international representatives and the SNC) when it held a conference in Tunis.

The Lebanese Communist Party has taken a particularly cautious stance. Although it has published articles in its newspapers by Syrian opposition leaders such as Michel Kilo, who does not belong to the SNC, it has stayed away from the demonstrations that have been taking place over the last year in front of the Syrian embassy in Beirut. What’s more, the party has come under fire from Lebanon’s far left because part of its leadership remains close to Qadri Jamil’s People’s Will Party. Jamil is a member of Syria’s “official” opposition, and in June Assad appointed him deputy prime minister for the economy in Riad Hijab’s government.

Another part of the Arab left calls for a gradual, reformist approach to the Syrian conflict, arguing the solution must be political not military. This position was reflected in the final communiqué from the Arab Nationalist Congress, which brought together around 200 delegates from Arab nationalist and leftist groups, and some Islamists, in Hammamet, Tunisia, in June (6). The document tried to be as consensual as possible. While recognising the Syrian people’s right to “freedom, democracy and the peaceful alternation of power between parties”, it condemned violence from all quarters, criticising both the regime and the armed opposition and calling on them to engage in dialogue based on Kofi Annan’s March 2012 peace plan.

  • Two Faces

While part of the radical Arab left still believes revolution is on the cards, a much larger proportion has given up on it, since it does not in fact want to see a violent collapse of the regime. The contradiction lies in an unspoken cold war. They fear a power vacuum and a post-Assad Syria reconciled with the US and allied to the Gulf states more than they fear the continuation of the current regime.

Leftwing Arab activists see Syria like Janus, with two faces. Few deny its authoritarian and repressive nature, but even today the regime’s defensive arguments, combined with the international sanctions against it, resonate with the Arab left’s deeply held anti-imperialist and third worldist convictions. In some these feelings are tempered by an attachment to the popular nature of the revolt; in others they are amplified by the conflict’s growing internationalisation.

The Arab Spring gave a boost to Islamists, leading to parties with their origins in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. No doubt this has caused some on the left to move the other way, fearing Arab revolutions because they could lead to Islamist hegemony. The Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, appear as ardent supporters of the Syrian opposition. So the position that much of the Arab left takes on Syria reflects its own clash with political Islam. That is why parties that normally claim to be “revolutionary” and “progressive”, even if they are not necessarily Marxist, are, paradoxically, hoping for a negotiated solution and gradual transition in Syria, for fear of disillusionment in the future.


Nicolas Dot-Pouillard is a researcher at the French Institute for the Near East in Beirut

(1) Al-Akhbar published the Arabic edition of Le Monde diplomatique as a supplement for one year.

(2) “Syrian Crisis: Three’s a Crowd”, Al-Akhbar English, 12 June 2012.

(3) Max Blumenthal, “The right to resist is universal: a farewell to Al-Akhbar and Assad’s apologists”, Al-Akhbar English, 20 June 2012.

(4) Fawwaz Traboulis teaches history at the Lebanese American University in Beirut, and is a former leading member of the Communist Action Organisation in Lebanon (OACL).

(5) The Syrian National Council was set up in summer 2011 and is based in Istanbul. It brings together a large part of the Syrian opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

(6) The Arab Nationalist Congress includes Baathist and Nasserist groupings, plus leftwing parties such as Morocco’s Unified Socialist Party, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Yemeni Socialist Party.


First published by one of CESRAN's content sharing partners, Le Monde Diplomatique.

 


AddThis
 

Israel’s Fear of Democracy in the Middle East

This month Egypt, known as the “mother of the Arab world” will, for the first time, hold a free and transparent Presidential election. This election will have a great impact both regionally and internationally not least upon its neighbour Israel.


BY Dr. MARWAN DARWEISH | June 2012

egypt-attacks-israeli

In the last few decades Israel has wasted no opportunity to make its claim to be the sole democracy in the Middle East sharing the same values as the liberal democracies of the West. It has suited Israel’s interests to hold this “unique” image of a country surrounded by Arab dictatorships.

Most of Israel’s and the US’ Arab allies in the Middle East are characterised by their corruption and undemocratic regimes such as Mubarak, Bin Ali, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf States. The people of these countries have experienced political and economic corruption, grinding poverty and frequent violations of their human rights.

The first response to the Arab revolutions, by both the Israeli public and the politicians, was one of complete surprise and denial portraying it as unauthentic and short lived.  As time went by, their propaganda focused upon the “danger to Israel” and the risk that the “Muslim Brothers” and other Muslim “extremists” would gain power and become a source of threat to Israel and the world. The Israeli image of the Arabs is one of being “anti-Semitic” and “Islamist in nature”. Arabs are perceived as undemocratic, fundamentalist and accepting of oppression and hierarchical authority, so it does not fit with this belief that they will call for social justice, freedom and democracy. Israel wants to maintain its image as the only democracy in the Middle East - as the “shining star” in the Arab darkness. Essentially Israel does not associate itself culturally, politically or economically as part of the Middle East, but rather as part of the West.

It came as no surprise then when Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister was very clear and blunt about the Arab Spring describing it as an: ‘Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, undemocratic wave’ and claimed that the Arab countries were ‘moving not forwards but backwards’

 Israel’s main concern is the impact of the Arab revolutions on the relationship with their peace partners; Egypt and Jordan. There is a growing public demand from the Egyptians to return the Israeli ambassador to Israel and show clear support to the Palestinians. There are also demands to reopen the contract to export gas to Israel that contained the subsidised conditions signed by the Mubarak regime.

The Arab leaders lacked credibility and support amongst their people because they violated their basic human and political rights. This seriously undermined their moral legitimacy and political power to criticise Israel about its violation of human rights and international law in the Palestinian occupied territories.  How could such a regime make any credible demand from Israel for statehood for the Palestinians whilst being the main cause of political and social injustice to their own people?

Since 2007 Egypt has played a leading role in mediating between Hamas and Fatah. However, different factors have contributed to the failure of the reconciliation efforts.  Any agreement was dependent upon Israel and US approval. Both had the leverage over Mubarak not to support any agreement that might strengthen Hamas and increase the influence of its allies. Under Mubarak, Egypt also aided Israel to reinforce a tight economic and diplomatic siege on the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip and to hermetically seal the Rafah crossing. An accountable parliament and president in Egypt will challenge this status quo; indeed we are already witnessing indications of this .


*Published in POLITICAL REFLECTION MAGAZINE (PR) | VOL. 3 | NO. 3
© Copyright 2012 by CESRAN
 
or


AddThis
 

Clouds of War over Middle East? Why an Attack against Iran is Impossible

It is obvious that Iran seeks a bigger share in the distribution of power in a post Cold War Middle East, especially now that the U.S. retreats its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. Although such an ambition could be realized through soft power tools (see Turkey), Iran has chosen to stand up against the West, mainly through its nuclear program and the threat this poses to the region of the Middle East.


BY PANAGIOTIS D. ANDRIKOPOULOS | June 2012

medvedev assad

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s anti-western and anti-Semitic discourse is trying to attract the Muslim community and put Iran high on hierarchy in the region, becoming automatically the “bad guy” of the Middle East, a scenario a la Iraq when Saddam also envisioned a bigger role for his country. However, in this case, the storyline will not be identical. Israel is the only country that really faces a direct threat, as Iran continues to defy the West and focus on its nuclear weapon building. Action needs to be taken in order to erase the danger. But why are things more difficult for Israel and the West right now? Why is military action against Iran out of the question at this very moment?

a) The ongoing Arab Spring, which started a year ago, although it had the positive outcome of throwing out of the “game” some lifetime dictators, left chaos and anarchy behind. These dictators had been supported by the West for many decades and suddenly the picture changed and the cards were reshuffled. How can the US cope with the ongoing situation? Obama has to deal with it, so a focus on Iran will undoubtedly restrain the U.S. and many of its interests in the Middle East, something that Americans cannot afford. Let us not forget the new focus of the US foreign policy on South East Asia and the Pacific in an attempt to contain the rising Chinese power.

b) While these lines are being written, Syria is still in huge turmoil and a high number of people die every day by government’s fire. The international community’s attention is currently guided to this direction, along with the UN resolution efforts, which are undermined by the Russian and Chinese vetoes. Iran does not want Assad to fall and tries its best to keep the current situation as it is because by doing that Ahmadinejad gains time for his nuclear visions. The U.S. expected Russia and China to behave as they did with the Libyan case but this time they stood against the West and made the UN reach a stalemate. Therefore, as long as the Syrian issue is not resolved, Iran is free in its moves.

c) What is Europe’s stance on Iran at the moment? So far, Europeans, other than posing economic sanctions against Iran, could not do any other harm mainly due to the economic crisis that threatens the EU’s very existence and its currency, the euro. Thus, for the time being, the big European powers (Germany, France and the UK) cannot collaborate with the U.S. and take up any military action against Iran as such action would be catastrophic for the EU.

d) Another important reason that no military action can take place is the domestic reality within the United States. The American public opinion cannot just give Obama the green light for another adventure in the Middle East after the fiascoes of Afghanistan and Iraq, where thousands of U.S. troops lost their lives while chasing Osama Bin Laden and trying, in vain, to discover weapons of massive destruction in Iraq. At the moment, the American President and its advisors are more concerned with the forthcoming presidential elections and another war, especially in the sensitive area of the Middle East, would undermine his image and maybe cost him his seat in the Oval Office.

e) The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, said around a month ago that Israel is preparing an attack against Iran in the next months. Without any doubt, Israel would like to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and prevent Iran from becoming a regional power. But, can this become a reality under the circumstances? It is certain that Israeli forces prepared many scenarios and plans for a possible war with Iran over the last years. As in the beginning of the 21st century and the case of Iraq, Israel does not want to be neighbors with a country that allegedly wants to eliminate it from the map. Therefore, a war against Iran would be ideal for Israel but on one condition: with the support from the West, especially, her transatlantic ally. But, as mentioned above, the U.S. cannot give this assurance to Israel given the current domestic, regional and international situation. The only solution, then, is only to force Iran diplomatically and economically, but not militarily and this is what frustrates the Israelis as time passes by against it.


*Published in POLITICAL REFLECTION MAGAZINE (PR) | VOL. 3 | NO. 3
© Copyright 2012 by CESRAN
 
or


AddThis
 

Page 1 of 20

By A Web Design

jga bookreview
jga manuscript
jcts manuscript
jCTS bookreview


CENTRE

for

STRATEGIC RESEARCH

and

ANALYSIS


© 2008 - 2013
All rights reserved.
Except for the information on CESRAN, assessments expressed in this site reflect only the opinions of their authors and do not represent the opinion of CESRAN

.
Site Meter