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European Studies Articles and Reports

Why We Need the Council of Europe

Strasbourg, the seat of many European institutions, will host the first World Forum for Democracy from 5 to 11 October. Unlike the EU, the European Council — a co-organiser of the Forum — works exclusively for human rights and freedoms. Democracy is still the mobilising force (for China’s opposition, Arab populations) but in the 21st century there is a real need for reform to address social inequalities and the crisis in political representation. In particular, the growing gap between ‘elites’ and the rest of the population (felt more and more in EU countries) requires building a new role for citizens and a new relationship between voters and those they elect
BY FABIO LIBERTI | SEPTEMBER 06, 2012
council of europe

The Council of Europe, based in Strasbourg, is probably Europe’s most misunderstood organisation. Even well-informed people confuse it with the European Council — the periodic gathering of European Union (EU) heads of state or government — and with the Council of the European Union, where ministers from each member state are responsible, alongside the European Parliament, for passing the EU’s laws and approving its budget.

The Council of Europe has nothing to do with the EU. It was created in 1949 by the Treaty of London, two years before the Treaty of Paris which set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first stage of European integration. The Council covers a different geographic area too, since it has 47 member countries (1) — most of the continent — compared with the EU’s 27 members (28 in 2013 when Croatia joins).

The Council started out with 10 members (2) but grew over the years — particularly after the collapse of the Communist bloc in 1989 — to include the entire continent with the exception of Belarus. Its objective is to help create an area of common democratic and legal principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention is the Council’s main achievement, and any country wishing to become a member of the Council must ratify it, organise free elections, abolish the death penalty and guarantee the rule of law. The task of the European Court of Human Rights, to which citizens can lodge an application directly, is to ensure respect for the Convention.

At a time when the European public, tired of the financial crisis and budget cuts, is calling into question the legitimacy of EU institutions and the purpose of integration, it is useful to turn our attention to an institution such as the Council, which has always put democracy and human rights at the forefront of its activities.

At the end of the second world war, the idea of Europe (which had been around since the 19th century and had grown stronger after 1918) quickly established itself as the best way to avoid another catastrophe. There were three schools of thought among those who favoured European integration: the “unionists” (including Churchill, and to some extent de Gaulle) who wanted countries to cooperate as much as possible while remaining sovereign states; the “federalists” who thought European countries had been so ineffective and shown such a propensity to violence that the best solution was to form a federation; and the “functionalists”, who could also be considered federalist, who believed that any economic and social integration would inevitably lead to political union by the “spill-over effect”. They included Jean Monnet (1888-1979), a French businessman posted to London during the second world war, who was taken with the Anglo-Saxon world and became one of the architects of European unity.

The various currents favouring integration met at The Hague in the Netherlands, 7-10 May 1948, for the Congress of Europe. The Congress brought together important political figures from 17 countries, and was presided over by Churchill (no longer the British prime minister). It closed with a resolution, the Message to Europeans drafted by Denis de Rougemont, appealing for an end to conflict. One of the consequences of this text was a recommendation to create an indirectly elected parliamentary assembly to study the political and legal implications of a European Union or Federation. Federalists saw this as a snub, as they wanted a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage.

The Berlin blockade, which came a few months later, set the western liberal democratic bloc firmly against the eastern Communist bloc. As the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were proclaimed, on 5 May 1949, ten countries established the Council of Europe.

It was far from the creation of a European federation: the Council of Europe was an intergovernmental organisation, and signatories did not transfer any of their sovereign power to it. It was expressly excluded from dealing with matters of defence, which were supervised by Nato, set up a month earlier by the same ten countries under the leadership of the US. The start of the cold war saw an increase in tension between the two blocs, particularly over Berlin and Budapest (1956).

Nonetheless the Council retained its humanist vision — sharpened by the extreme violence of Nazi domination and war, and by the happier creative chaos of the Hague Congress. It was imbued with a pluralist vision of Europe (as opposed to a Stalinist people’s democracy) and respect for fundamental rights. While Europe embarked on the road towards union two years later, with the creation of the ECSC, then in 1957 with the European Economic Community (EEC), there remained at the core of the Council something more deeply “political” than integration based on a common market of competition and free trade.

When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, creating the EEC, the media and officialdom turned their attention from the Council, to follow the functionalist construction that Monnet, with his method of “small steps”, had envisaged. Economics was seen as the solution to every problem; democracy and human rights were taken for granted, and not worthy of in-depth discussion. General de Gaulle described the Council as “that sleeping beauty on the banks of the Rhine”, referring to its headquarters in Strasbourg. The Council spent the cold war period concerning itself with cultural rapprochement and the civil and legal rights of member states.

The Council enjoyed a rebirth in 1989 when revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) put democracy, in the liberal sense of the word, back at the heart of the debate. Movements like Solidarity in Poland became the symbols of protest against Communist regimes, and they naturally became interested in the work of the Council. In the middle of the glasnost period (3), the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev chose the Council as a “neutral” platform to expound his vision of a “common European home”. Catherine Lalumière, then Secretary General of the Council, convinced of the important role it could play, restored its proactive stance, increased its contacts and developed democracy programmes that were applied throughout the CEE. The Council is often perceived as the antechamber of the EU and its common market, and associated with economic prosperity, even though no legal link exists between the two.

The Council’s revival lasted a decade, until the CEE joined the EU, and it returned to relative obscurity. The timidity with which it demanded a peaceful solution to the bloody conflict in Chechnya in 1999-2000 caused its moral authority to be called into question for a time. There had already been heated debate when Russia joined in 1996. More generally, the failure of many European countries to challenge new members who flouted democratic principles sometimes undermines the organisation’s credibility.

The European public’s disenchantment with the EU is no doubt rooted in the over-importance given to the economy, financial circles and the powers of the European Commission (without any real democratic counterpart), in the process of integration. It is becoming harder to bridge the gulf between populations in crisis, searching for a meaning in a globalised world, and a Union perceived as distant, technocratic, illegitimate and undemocratic. The political philosophy underpinning the Council seems to have been forgotten. Yet if it were applied to the Union, it might give new meaning to integration. Europe’s citizens and leaders could benefit greatly from the lessons of the Hague Congress, the words of Rougemont — and the rediscovery of the Council of Europe.


First published at Le Monde diplomatique.

Fabio Liberti is research director at l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Paris

(1) Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

(2) Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom.

(3) Policy of “transparency” introduced in the Soviet Union in 1985.

 


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Has The European Commission Acquired More Power Due To The Euro Area Debt Crisis

The European Commission has always been the object of debates and analyses as to what extent the European Union (EU) political structure is democratic, since the structure of the Commission and its relations with the European Parliament have been regarded by many scholars as the main reasons why the EU suffers from a “democratic deficit”.


BY Dr DILEK YIGIT | JULY 2012

European-commission

After the global financial crisis broke out, measures taken to cope with the implications of the euro area debt crisis and to prevent another potential crisis have renewed the debates on democracy at EU level, in particular on the European Commission’s role in the new European economic governance.

Why has the European Commission been a part of debates on a “democratic deficit” in the EU? The answer to this question is complex and many-faceted. Because the first aspect of this question is related to how the European Union and its executive body Commission can be defined; Is the Commission a sui-generis body of sui generis organisation? or can the Commission be compared with a government in the member states as the EU is becoming more like a state? It can be argued that the EU is becoming more like a state due to the continuous European integration process; nonetheless there is not a clear-cut answer on which scholars agree to the question of how exactly the Commission can be defined or whether it should be a government in the conventional meaning of the term. For example, S. Hix points out that the Commission may be defined as sui generis through stating that “the Commission is neither a government nor a bureaucracy, and is appointed through what appears to be an obscure procedure rather than elected directly by the votes or indirectly after a parliamentary election.”[i] While F. Laursen underlines the similarities between the Commission and a national government by expressing “to a certain extent, the Commission can be compared with a government in the member states. It takes political initiatives, it proposes legislation, it has a bureaucracy at its disposal, it gets involved in policy implementation.”[ii]

The second aspect of this question is related to the democratisation of the European Union. In this context, the question of how the president and members of the Commission should be appointed/elected for a more democratic Union has led to political and theoretical debates so far, and many scholars argue that the democratisation of the European Union through the gradual increase of power of the European Parliament over the European Commission has caused politicisation of the Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon brought about further politicisation of the Commission by defining the role of the European Parliament in the nomination of the Commission President explicitly.  Article 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that

“Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for the President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members...”

It can be argued that the Treaty of Lisbon provides the Commission with greater democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, after the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission is still an executive body that remains unfamiliar to both parliamentarism and presidentialism, which may arise more concerns especially in the light of Article 10 of the Treaty stipulating that the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.

Furthermore, measures taken for strengthening fiscal discipline and introducing stricter fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance in the EU due to the euro area debt crisis received serious criticism on the grounds that these measures give greater role to the European Commission in the surveillance of national economic and financial policies, that is the Commission acquires more powers although its democratic legitimacy and democratic accountability have been questioned.  

The aim of this article is to try to address more centrally the question of whether the Commission is becoming more powerful due to the measures taken after the euro area debt crisis and if so, why it receives criticism from a democratic perspective.  Let’s analyse each measure and what they mean to  the Commission in brief.

The European Semester which was approved by the member states on September 2010 for stronger economic governance and coordination at EU level means ex ante coordination of member states budgetary and economic policies, and it starts each year when the Commission publishes the Annual Growth Survey. On the basis of the Annual Growth Survey, member states identify the main economic issues which the EU faces and give policy advices at the Spring Council. The salient aspect of the European Semester is that the European Council and the Council of Ministers provide policy advice before  the member states’ draft budget for the following year are finalised.[iii] Although the Commission’s role under the European Semester has received criticism on the grounds that the Commission can give direction to national fiscal policies,  the European Council, Council of the European Union and the European Parliament are also given active roles under the European Semester in order to provide legitimacy for this new mechanism.[iv]


*Published in POLITICAL REFLECTION MAGAZINE (PR) | VOL. 3 | NO. 3
© Copyright 2012 by CESRAN
 
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Security Policy in the European Union and the United States through the Issue of Their Defence Expenditures

Security policy is a very important factor of a nation’s strength as it determines considerably its political independence and social stability. Security policy is not just the implementation of a nation’s deterrence policy so as to protect its human capital and infrastructure but also it is the way of preservation and protection of a society’s values and principles by external threats or challenges. However, in order to be credible and plausible, security policy needs effective armed forces, which consequentially means that their efficiency is determined predominantly by the level of a nation’s defence expenditures.

BY DR THEODORE METAXAS and EMMANOUIL MARIOS L. ECONOMOU | MAY 11, 2012 

forces

The need for powerful armed forces had already been noted since ancient times. Power, for Thucydides, is expressed through military means and measured through military capabilities. The 5th century A.D. latin author Vegetius suggested to the Roman emperors “si vis pacem, para bellum”, which means “if you wish for peace, prepare for war”. Niccolò Machiavelli, in accordance with Thucydides and Vegetius proposes that force is related to military capabilities, while the 18th century King of Prussia, Frederick the Great had come to the conclusion that “diplomacy without credible armed forces is like music without instruments.” Finally, the famous Prussian General and war theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in his On War suggests that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”.

The correlation between security and military capabilities is also corroborated by modern scholars of international relations. Some examples include Edward Carr who in his Twenty Years Crisis proposes that military strength plays the crucial role for the formation of international relations, a thesis consistent with Frederic the Great’s ideas. Another leading representative of the “classical realist” school of international relationships, Hans Morgenthau, admits that military strength is the predominant (but not the only) factor for the political power of a nation. 

The major contribution of our analysis in this paper is that we examine how defence expenditures affected security policy in both Europe and the United States. Although we acknowledge that this is hardly an approach that fully justifies by its own the ways which security policy is shaped by states globally, we do think however that the issue of defence expenditures is of major importance when a state intends to implement its grand strategy, a major implication of which, includes its security policy. In the first chapter we further analyze the issue of a nation’s power based on military spending. Our findings, both theoretical and empirical indicate that military spending can have negative or positive implications not only in geopolitics but also in other aspects of a nation’s grand strategy, like economic performance.


Published in Journal of Global Analysis (PR) Vol. 3  No. 2



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Cypriot Natural Gas and the Eastern Mediterranean: Between Crisis and Cooperation

Natural resources have long been the cause of both development and conflict. Of course, in resource-abundant countries natural resources have, more often than not, caused conflict rather than development. However, the same cannot be said for third countries, often colonial powers, which exploited such resources abroad for their own development.


BY ZENONAS TZIARRAS | APRIL 19, 2012

cyprus

This is one of the reasons why natural resources have been often referred to as a “curse”; an additional reason is the implications that the existence of natural resources has for the management of the economy (e.g. high prices, low exports, etc.).

Cyprus has itself effectively acquired the status of a resource-abundant country when recently, on what was called “an historic” day, the President of the Republic Demetris Christofias announced that the Block 12 of the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) “contained an estimated 5 to 8 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas”. As “the second-largest hydrocarbon discovery in Europe in more than a decade”, the Cypriot natural gas paves the way for not only local but also regional development and cooperation. However, there is always the flip side of the coin and that is the international rivalry that may be triggered due to the alteration of the regional balance of power as a result of this and other developments. Below I briefly examine the features of the limited crisis surrounding the Cypriot natural gas and the Eastern Mediterranean more generally, as well as the features of a potential international cooperation at the regional and trans-regional level. The goal is to determine whether bilateral disputes could be bridged, given the political and geopolitical realities at hand, to the end of avoiding a crisis escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

  • The Features of the Crisis

The drillings for the discovery of natural gas by the Republic of Cyprus in late September, 2011, came in the midst of greater regional instability as, for example, the Arab revolts were in progress, the Turkish-Israeli relations were in decline, and the Kurdish attacks in Turkey were increasing. Furthermore, the long-standing Cyprus problem is an essential component of this crisis as Turkey, according to its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, considers the internationally unrecognized (apart from Turkey) “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) as “a state of whom..[it] is the protector”, and adds that it “assume[s] an aggressive attitude if a country attempts to unilaterally use…[its] natural resources”. It is within this context that Turkey justified its threats for naval action against Cyprus, the initiation of gas explorations close to Cyprus’ drilling area, as well as the delimitation of its continental shelf with TRNC.

 


Published in Political Reflection Magazine (PR) Vol. 3  No. 2

 


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Culture, Religion, EU-Turkey and Cyprus: Dilemma

Cultural differences have become, in the eyes of some, an impediment to Turkish accession to the EU. French sociologist Amaury de Riencourt makes a clear distinction between culture and civilization. From his perspective, “..Culture and Civilisation are two expressions that have been used more or less indiscriminately and interchangeably in the past. The distinction between them is of organic succession. They do not coincide in time but follow each other during the life span of a particular society: each Culture engenders its own Civilisation...”


BY RET. AMB. YALIM ERALP | APRIL 18, 2012

EUflag

He says, “Civilization represents the crystallization on a gigantic scale of the preceding culture’s deepest and greatest thoughts and style. Civilization aims at the gradual standardization of increasingly large masses of men within a rigidly mechanical framework.”1 If this logic is correct, the world is increasingly becoming one civilization. Indeed, the author states that “the 20th century is the dramatic watershed separating the culture behind us from the civilization that lies ahead.”

The Turkish people throughout history have met different cultures, have been influenced by them and have accumulated various customs and mores in their journey. Nations, in time, adapt to influences in differing ways.

Today many in Europe consider that Turks come from a different culture and focus on issues such as “honour killings” and violence against women. It is true that there are cultural differences. But I submit that such unfortunate issues are not peculiar to Turks. “Crime de passion” is not alien to the Mediterranean nations; nor is violence against women as witnessed by Spain trying to grapple with this problem. Turkey should indeed eradicate such practices.

Differences in the European Union exist even within nations; and there are of course differences between city dwellers and the rural folk. The differences between the northern and the southern parts of a country are notable. The differences between Nordic culture and the Mediterranean outlook are not minimal.

Nations’ behaviour and attitudes depend on and change in relation to their environment and events. During the 1990’s when Turkey was fighting against terror groups on its soil, European partners were admonishing Turkey for some of the more stringent laws. Yet, after 9/11 and when Europe faced terrorism, some EU members had to take similar stringent measures. When it comes to Turkey, to use the words of an American poet and lecturer, Ralph Emerson, “people only see what they are prepared to see.”

When one looks at the issue from afar, I would venture to say that differences between an average American and an average European are quite wide, perhaps wider than those with Turks. Certainly, there are religious underpinnings in every society. As the European Union’s motto is integrating diversity, then religious difference should not be an insurmountable obstacle. French sociologist, Edgar Morin put it aptly. According to him Europe is “a complex whose attribute is to bring together the greatest diversities without confusion, and to associate opposites in a non-separable manner… there is nothing that was hers from the beginning, and nothing which is exclusively hers today…That which underlies the unity of European culture is not the Judeo-Graeco-Roman synthesis, but the not only complementary but also the competitive and antagonistic interplay between these separate traditions, each of which has its own logic.”2 In this context, it is worth mentioning an article by British historian Eric Hobsbawm in Le Monde on September 25,2008 called l’Europe; mythe, histoire, réalité. One paragraph illustrates the complexities of Europe :...The values which dominated Europe in the 20th century-nationalisms, fascisms, marxist-leninisms are also purely European make as much as liberalism and laisser-faire. In contrast, other civilisations have practiced some of these values said “european” before Europe. The Chinese and Ottoman Empires practiced religious tolerance in favor of Jews expelled by Spain. It is only at the end of the 20th century that the institutions and values in question have spread, at least theoretically, in all of Europe. The “European values” have gained currency in the second half of the 20th century. That the institutions and values in question have spread, at least theoretically, in all of Europe. The “European values “ have gained currency in the 2nd half of the 20th century..” Turkey has long been preached to by our partners that cultural diversity is richness. If this is true in a country; it should also be true continent-wide and Europe should not deprive itself by refusing Turkey on the basis of religious and cultural differences!


 Published as TURKEY FOCUS POLICY BRIEF No: 1


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